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Abstract
In classic fair division problems such as cake cutting and rent
division, envy-freeness requires that each individual (weakly)
prefer his allocation to anyone else’s. On a conceptual level,
we argue that envy-freeness also provides a compelling notion
of fairness for classification tasks. Our technical focus is the
generalizability of envy-free classification, i.e., understanding
whether a classifier that is envy free on a sample would be
almost envy free with respect to the underlying distribution
with high probability. Our main result establishes that a small
sample is sufficient to achieve such guarantees, when the
classifier in question is a mixture of deterministic classifiers
that belong to a family of low Natarajan dimension.
1 Introduction
The study of fairness in machine learning is driven by an
abundance of examples where learning algorithms were per-
ceived as discriminating against protected groups (Sweeney,
2013; Datta, Tschantz, and Datta, 2015). Addressing this
problem requires a conceptual — perhaps even philosophi-
cal — understanding of what fairness means in this context.
In other words, the million dollar question is (arguably1)
this: What are the formal constraints that fairness imposes
on learning algorithms? On a very high level, most of the
answers proposed so far (Luong, Ruggieri, and Turini, 2011;
Dwork et al., 2012; Zemel et al., 2013; Hardt, Price, and
Srebro, 2016; Joseph et al., 2016; Zafar et al., 2017) fall into
two (partially overlapping) categories: individual fairness
notions, and group fairness notions.
In the former category, the best known example is the in-
fluential fair classification model of Dwork et al. (2012). The
model involves a set of individuals and a set of outcomes. It
is instructive to think of financially-motivated settings where
the outcomes are, say, credit card offerings or displayed ad-
vertisements, and a loss function represents the benefit (e.g.,
in terms of revenue) of mapping a given individual to a given
outcome. The centerpiece of the model is a similarity metric
on the space of individuals; it is specific to the classification
task at hand, and ideally captures the ethical ground truth
about relevant attributes. For example, a man and a woman
who are similar in every other way should be considered simi-
lar for the purpose of credit card offerings, but perhaps not for
1Recent work takes a somewhat different view (Kilbertus et al.,
2017).
lingerie advertisements. Assuming such a metric is available,
fairness can be naturally formalized as a Lipschitz constraint,
which requires that individuals who are close according to the
similarity metric be mapped to distributions over outcomes
that are close according to some standard metric (such as total
variation). The algorithmic problem is then to find a classifier
that minimizes loss, subject to the Lipschitz constraint.
As attractive as this model is, it has one clear weakness
from a practical viewpoint: the availability of a similarity
metric. Dwork et al. (2012) are well aware of this issue; they
write that justifying this assumption is “one of the most chal-
lenging aspects” of their approach. They add that “in reality
the metric used will most likely only be society’s current best
approximation to the truth.” But, despite recent progress on
automating ethical decisions in certain domains (Noothigattu
et al., 2018; Freedman et al., 2018), the task-specific nature
of the similarity metric makes even a credible approximation
thereof seem unrealistic. In particular, if one wanted to learn
a similarity metric, it is unclear what type of examples a
relevant dataset would consist of.
An alternative notion of individual fairness, therefore, is
called for. And our proposal draws on an extensive body of
work on rigorous approaches to fairness, which — modulo
one possible exception (see Section 1.2) — has not been
tapped by machine learning researchers: the literature on
fair division (Brams and Taylor, 1996; Moulin, 2003). The
most prominent notion is that of envy-freeness (Foley, 1967;
Varian, 1974), which, in the context of the allocation of goods,
requires that the utility of each individual for his allocation
be at least as high as his utility for the allocation of any other
individual; this is the gold standard of fairness for problems
such as cake cutting (Robertson and Webb, 1998; Procaccia,
2013) and rent division (Su, 1999; Gal et al., 2017).
Similarly, in the classification setting, envy-freeness would
simply mean that the utility of each individual for his distri-
bution over outcomes is at least as high as his utility for the
distribution over outcomes assigned to any other individual.
For example, it may well be the case that Bob is offered a
worse credit card than that offered to Alice (in terms of, say,
annual fees), but this outcome is not unfair if Bob is genuinely
more interested in the card offered to him because he does
not qualify for Alice’s card, or because its specific rewards
program better fits his needs. Such rich utility functions
are also evident in the context of job advertisements (Datta,
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Tschantz, and Datta, 2015): people generally want higher
paying jobs, but would presumably have higher utility for see-
ing advertisements for jobs that better fit their qualifications
and interests.
Of course, as before, envy-freeness requires access to in-
dividuals’ utility functions, but — in stark contrast to the
similarity metric of Dwork et al. (2012) — we do not view
this assumption as a barrier to implementation. Indeed, there
are a variety of techniques for learning utility functions (Cha-
jewska, Koller, and Ormoneit, 2001; Nielsen and Jensen,
2004; Balcan et al., 2012). Moreover, in our running example
of advertising, one can even think of standard measures like
expected click-through rate (CTR) as an excellent proxy for
utility.
It is worth noting that the classification setting is different
from classic fair division problems in that the “goods” (out-
comes) are non-excludable. In fact, one envy-free solution
simply assigns each individual to his favorite outcome; but
when the loss function disagrees with the utility functions, it
may be possible to achieve smaller loss without violating the
envy-freeness constraint.
In summary, we view envy-freeness as a compelling, well-
established, and, importantly, practicable notion of individual
fairness for classification tasks. Our goal is to understand its
learning-theoretic properties.
1.1 Our Results
The technical challenge we face is that the space of individ-
uals is potentially huge, yet we seek to provide universal
envy-freeness guarantees. To this end, we are given a sample
consisting of individuals drawn from an unknown distribu-
tion. We are interested in learning algorithms that minimize
loss, subject to satisfying the envy-freeness constraint, on
the sample. Our primary technical question is that of gen-
eralizability, that is, given a classifier that is envy free on
a sample, is it approximately envy free on the underlying
distribution? Surprisingly, Dwork et al. (2012) do not study
generalizability in their model, and we are aware of only one
subsequent paper that takes a learning-theoretic viewpoint
on individual fairness and gives theoretical guarantees (see
Section 1.2).
In Section 3, we do not constrain the classifier in question.
Therefore, we need some strategy to extend a classifier that
is defined on a sample; assigning an individual the same
outcome as his nearest neighbor in the sample is a popular
choice. However, we show that any strategy for extending a
classifier from a sample, on which it is envy free, to the entire
set of individuals is unlikely to be approximately envy free on
the underlying distribution, unless the sample is exponentially
large.
For this reason, in Section 4, we focus on structured fam-
ilies of classifiers. On a high level, our goal is to relate the
combinatorial richness of the family to generalization guar-
antees. One obstacle is that standard notions of dimension do
not extend to the analysis of randomized classifiers, whose
range is distributions over outcomes (equivalently, real vec-
tors). We circumvent this obstacle by considering mixtures
of deterministic classifiers that belong to a family of bounded
Natarajan dimension (an extension of the well-known VC
dimension to multi-class classification). Our main technical
result asserts that, under this assumption, envy-freeness on a
sample does generalize to the underlying distribution, even
if the sample is relatively small (its size grows almost lin-
early in the Natarajan dimension). Finally, we discuss the
implications of this result in Section 5.
1.2 Related Work
Conceptually, our work is most closely related to work by
Zafar et al. (2017). They are interested in group notions of
fairness, and advocate preference-based notions instead of
parity-based notions. In particular, they assume that each
group has a utility function for classifiers, and define the
preferred treatment property, which requires that the utility
of each group for its own classifier be at least its utility
for the classifier assigned to any other group. Their model
and results focus on the case of binary classification where
there is a desirable outcome and an undesirable outcome, so
the utility of a group for a classifier is simply the fraction
of its members that are mapped to the desirable outcome.
Although, at first glance, this notion seems similar to envy-
freeness, it is actually fundamentally different.2 Our paper
is also completely different from that of Zafar et al. in terms
of technical results; theirs are purely empirical in nature, and
focus on the increase in accuracy obtained when parity-based
notions of fairness are replaced with preference-based ones.
Very recent, concurrent work by Rothblum and Yona
(2018) provides generalization guarantees for the metric no-
tion of individual fairness introduced by Dwork et al. (2012),
or, more precisely, for an approximate version thereof. There
are two main differences compared to our work: first, we
propose envy-freeness as an alternative notion of fairness that
circumvents the need for a similarity metric. Second, they
focus on randomized binary classification, which amounts to
learning a real-valued function, and so are able to make use of
standard Rademacher complexity results to show generaliza-
tion. By contrast, standard tools do not directly apply in our
setting. It is worth noting that several other papers provide
generalization guarantees for notions of group fairness, but
these are more distantly related to our work (Zemel et al.,
2013; Woodworth et al., 2017; Donini et al., 2018; Kearns et
al., 2018; He´bert-Johnson et al., 2018).
2 The Model
We assume that there is a space X of individuals, a finite
space Y of outcomes, and a utility function u : X × Y →
[0, 1] encoding the preferences of each individual for the
outcomes in Y . In the advertising example, individuals are
users, outcomes are advertisements, and the utility function
reflects the benefit an individual derives from being shown a
particular advertisement. For any distribution p ∈ ∆(Y)
2On a philosophical level, the fair division literature deals ex-
clusively with individual notions of fairness. In fact, even in group-
based extensions of envy-freeness (Manurangsi and Suksompong,
2017) the allocation is shared by groups, but individuals must not
be envious. We subscribe to the view that group-oriented notions
(such as statistical parity) are objectionable, because the outcome
can be patently unfair to individuals.
(where ∆(Y) is the set of distributions over Y) we let
u(x, p) = Ey∼p[u(x, y)] denote individual x’s expected util-
ity for an outcome sampled from p. We refer to a function
h : X → ∆(Y) as a classifier, even though it can return a
distribution over outcomes.
2.1 Envy-Freeness
Roughly speaking, a classifier h : X → ∆(Y) is envy free
if no individual prefers the outcome distribution of someone
else over his own.
Definition 1. A classifier h : X → ∆(Y) is envy free (EF)
on a set S of individuals if u(x, h(x)) ≥ u(x, h(x′)) for
all x, x′ ∈ S. Similarly, h is (α, β)-EF with respect to a
distribution P on X if
Pr
x,x′∼P
(
u(x, h(x)) < u(x, h(x′))− β) ≤ α.
Finally, h is (α, β)-pairwise EF on a set of pairs of individu-
als S = {(xi, x′i)}ni=1 if
1
n
n∑
i=1
I{u(xi, h(xi)) < u(xi, h(x′i))− β} ≤ α.
Any classifier that is EF on a sample S of individuals is
also (α, β)-pairwise EF on any pairing of the individuals in S,
for any α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0. The weaker pairwise EF condition
is all that is required for our generalization guarantees to
hold.
2.2 Optimization and Learning
Our formal learning problem can be stated as follows. Given
sample access to an unknown distribution P over individ-
uals X and their utility functions, and a known loss func-
tion ` : X × Y → [0, 1], find a classifier h : X → ∆(Y)
that is (α, β)-EF with respect to P minimizing expected
loss Ex∼P [`(x, h(x))], where for x ∈ X and p ∈ ∆(Y),
`(x, p) = Ey∼p[`(x, y)].
We follow the empirical risk minimization (ERM) learn-
ing approach, i.e., we collect a sample of individuals drawn
i.i.d from P and find an EF classifier with low loss on
the sample. Formally, given a sample of individuals S =
{x1, . . . , xn} and their utility functions uxi(·) = u(xi, ·),
we are interested in a classifier h : S → ∆(Y) that mini-
mizes
∑n
i=1 `(xi, h(xi)) among all classifiers that are EF on
S. The algorithmic problem itself is beyond the scope of the
current paper; see Section 5 for further discussion.
Recall that we consider randomized classifiers that can
assign a distribution over outcomes to each of the individu-
als. However, one might wonder whether the EF classifier
that minimizes loss on a sample happens to always be de-
terministic. Or, at least, the optimal deterministic classifier
on the sample might incur a loss that is very close to that
of the optimal randomized classifier. If this were true, we
could restrict ourselves to classifiers of the form h : X → Y ,
which would be much easier to analyze. Unfortunately, it
turns out that this is not the case. In fact, there could be an
arbitrary (multiplicative) gap between the optimal random-
ized EF classifier and the optimal deterministic EF classifier.
The intuition behind this is as follows. A deterministic clas-
sifier that has very low loss on the sample, but is not EF,
would be completely discarded in the deterministic setting.
On the other hand, a randomized classifier could take this
loss-minimizing deterministic classifier and mix it with a
classifier with high “negative envy”, so that the mixture ends
up being EF and at the same time has low loss. This is made
concrete in Example 1 in the appendix.
3 Arbitrary Classifiers
An important (and typical) aspect of our learning problem is
that the classifier h needs to provide an outcome distribution
for every individual, not just those in the sample. For ex-
ample, if h chooses advertisements for visitors of a website,
the classifier should still apply when a new visitor arrives.
Moreover, when we use the classifier for new individuals,
it must continue to be EF. In this section, we consider two-
stage approaches that first choose outcome distributions for
the individuals in the sample, and then extend those decisions
to the rest of X .
In more detail, we are given a sample S = {x1, . . . , xn}
of individuals and a classifier h : S → ∆(Y) assigning
outcome distributions to each individual. Our goal is to
extend these assignments to a classifier h : X → ∆(Y) that
can be applied to new individuals as well. For example, h
could be the loss-minimizing EF classifier on the sample S.
For this section, we assume that X is equipped with a
distance metric d. Moreover, we assume in this section that
the utility function u is L-Lipschitz on X . That is, for every
y ∈ Y and for all x, x′ ∈ X , we have |u(x, y)− u(x′, y)| ≤
L · d(x, x′).
Under the foregoing assumptions, one natural way to ex-
tend the classifier on the sample to all of X is to assign new
individuals the same outcome distribution as their nearest
neighbor in the sample. Formally, for a set S ⊂ X and
any individual x ∈ X , let NNS(x) ∈ arg minx′∈Sd(x, x′)
denote the nearest neighbor of x in S with respect to the
metric d (breaking ties arbitrarily). The following simple
result (whose proof is relegated to Appendix B) establishes
that this approach preserves envy-freeness in cases where the
sample is exponentially large.
Theorem 1. Let d be a metric on X , P be a distribution on
X , and u be an L-Lipschitz utility function. Let S be a set
of individuals such that there exists Xˆ ⊂ X with P (Xˆ ) ≥
1− α and supx∈Xˆ (d(x,NNS(x)) ≤ β/(2L). Then for any
classifier h : S → ∆(Y) that is EF on S, the extension
h : X → ∆(Y) given by h(x) = h(NNS(x)) is (α, β)-EF
on P .
The conditions of Theorem 1 require that the set of in-
dividuals S is a β/(2L)-net for at least a (1 − α)-fraction
of the mass of P on X . In several natural situations, an ex-
ponentially large sample guarantees that this occurs with
high probability. For example, if X is a subset of Rq,
d(x, x′) = ‖x − x′‖2, and X has diameter at most D, then
for any distribution P on X , if S is an i.i.d. sample of size
O( 1α (
LD
√
q
β )
q(q log
LD
√
q
β + log
1
δ )), it will satisfy the con-
ditions of Theorem 1 with probability at least 1 − δ. This
sampling result is folklore, but, for the sake of completeness,
we prove it in Lemma 5 of Appendix B.
However, the exponential upper bound given by the near-
est neighbor strategy is as far as we can go in terms of gen-
eralizing envy-freeness from a sample (without further as-
sumptions). Specifically, our next result establishes that any
algorithm — even randomized — for extending classifiers
from the sample to the entire space X requires an exponen-
tially large sample of individuals to ensure envy-freeness on
the distribution P . The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in
Appendix B.
Theorem 2. There exists a space of individuals X ⊂ Rq,
and a distribution P over X such that, for every randomized
algorithm A that extends classifiers on a sample to X , there
exists an L-Lipschitz utility function u such that, when a
sample of individuals S of size n = 4q/2 is drawn from
P without replacement, there exists an EF classifier on S
for which, with probability at least 1 − 2 exp(−4q/100) −
exp(−4q/200) jointly over the randomness of A and S, its
extension by A is not (α, β)-EF with respect to P for any
α < 1/25 and β < L/8.
We remark that a similar result would hold even if we
sampled S with replacement; we sample here without re-
placement purely for ease of exposition.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let the space of individuals be X =
[0, 1]q and the outcomes be Y = {0, 1}. We partition the
space X into cubes of side length s = 1/4. So, the total
number of cubes is m = (1/s)q = 4q. Let these cubes be
denoted by c1, c2, . . . cm, and let their centers be denoted
by µ1, µ2, . . . µm. Next, let P be the uniform distribution
over the centers µ1, µ2, . . . µm. For brevity, whenever we
say “utility function” in the rest of the proof, we mean “L-
Lipschitz utility function.”
To prove the theorem, we use Yao’s minimax princi-
ple (Yao, 1977). Specifically, consider the following two-
player zero sum game. Player 1 chooses a deterministic
algorithm D that extends classifiers on a sample to X , and
player 2 chooses a utility function u on X . For any subset
S ⊂ X , define the classifier hu,S : S → Y by assigning
each individual in S to his favorite outcome with respect
to the utility function u, i.e. hu,S(x) = arg maxy∈Yu(x, y)
for each x ∈ S, breaking ties lexicographically. Define
the cost of playing algorithm D against utility function u
as the probability over the sample S (of size m/2 drawn
from P without replacement) that the extension of hu,S by
D is not (α, β)-EF with respect to P for any α < 1/25 and
β < L/8. Yao’s minimax principle implies that for any
randomized algorithm A, its expected cost with respect to
the worst-case utility function u is at least as high as the
expected cost of any distribution over utility functions that
is played against the best deterministic algorithm D (which
is tailored for that distribution). Therefore, we establish
the desired lower bound by choosing a specific distribution
over utility functions, and showing that the best determin-
istic algorithm against it has an expected cost of at least
1− 2 exp(−m/100)− exp(−m/200).
To define this distribution over utility functions, we first
sample outcomes y1, y2, . . . , ym i.i.d. from Bernoulli(1/2).
Figure 1: Illustration of X and an example utility function
u for d = 2. Red shows preference for 1, blue shows pref-
erence for 0, and darker shades correspond to more intense
preference. (The gradients are rectangular to match the L∞
norm, so, strangely enough, the misleading X pattern is an
optical illusion.)
Then, we associate each cube center µi with the outcome yi,
and refer to this outcome as the favorite of µi. For brevity, let
¬y denote the outcome other than y, i.e. ¬y = (1− y). For
any x ∈ X , we define the utility function as follows. Letting
cj be the cube that x belongs to,
u(x, yj) = L
[s
2
− ‖x− µj‖∞
]
; u(x,¬yj) = 0. (1)
See Figure 1 for an illustration.
We claim that the utility function of Equation (1) is indeed
L-Lipschitz with respect to any Lp norm. This is because for
any cube ci, and for any x, x′ ∈ ci, we have
|u(x, yi)− u(x′, yi)| = L |‖x− µi‖∞ − ‖x′ − µi‖∞|
≤ L‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ L‖x− x′‖p.
Moreover, for the other outcome, we have u(x,¬yi) =
u(x′,¬yi) = 0. It follows that u is L-Lipschitz within ev-
ery cube. At the boundary of the cubes, the utility for any
outcome is 0, and hence u is also continuous throughout X .
Because it is piecewise Lipschitz and continuous, u must be
L-Lipschitz throughout X , with respect to any Lp norm.
Next, let D be an arbitrary deterministic algorithm that
extends classifiers on a sample to X . We draw the sample
S of size m/2 from P without replacement. Consider the
distribution over favorites of individuals in S. Each individ-
ual in S has a favorite that is sampled independently from
Bernoulli(1/2). Hence, by Hoeffding’s inequality, the frac-
tion of individuals in S with a favorite of 0 is between 12 − 
and 12 +  with probability at least 1 − 2 exp(−m2). The
same holds simultaneously for the fraction of individuals
with favorite 1.
Given the sample S and the utility function u on the sample
(defined by the instantiation of their favorites), consider the
classifier hu,S , which maps each individual µi in the sample
S to his favorite yi. This classifier is clearly EF on the
sample. Consider the extension hDu,S of hu,S to the whole
of X as defined by algorithm D. Define two sets Z0 and
Z1 by letting Zy = {µj /∈ S | hDu,S(µj) = y}, and let y∗
denote an outcome that is assigned to at least half of the
out-of-sample centers, i.e., an outcome for which |Zy∗ | ≥|Z¬y∗ |. Furthermore, let θ denote the fraction of out-of-
sample centers assigned to y∗. Note that, since |S| = m/2,
the number of out-of-sample centers is also exactly m/2.
This gives us |Zy∗ | = θm2 , where θ ≥ 12 .
Consider the distribution of favorites in Zy∗ (these are
independent from the ones in the sample since Zy∗ is dis-
joint from S). Each individual in this set has a favorite
sampled independently from Bernoulli(1/2). Hence, by Ho-
effding’s inequality, the fraction of individuals in Zy∗ whose
favorite is ¬y∗ is at least 12 −  with probability at least
1− exp(−m2 2). We conclude that with a probability at least
1− 2 exp(−m2)− exp(−m2 2), the sample S and favorites
(which define the utility function u) are such that: (i) the
fraction of individuals in S whose favorite is y ∈ {0, 1} is
between 12 −  and 12 + , and (ii) the fraction of individuals
in Zy∗ whose favorite is ¬y∗ is at least 12 − .
We now show that for such a sample S and utility func-
tion u, hDu,S cannot be (α, β)-EF with respect to P for any
α < 1/25 and β < L/8. To this end, sample x and x′
from P . One scenario where x envies x′ occurs when (i) the
favorite of x is ¬y∗, (ii) x is assigned to y∗, and (iii) x′ is
assigned to ¬y∗. Conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied when
x is in Zy∗ and his favorite is ¬y∗. We know that at least a
1
2 −  fraction of the individuals in Zy∗ have the favorite ¬y∗.
Hence, the probability that conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied
by x is at least ( 12 − )|Zy∗ | 1m = ( 12 − ) θ2 . Condition (iii)
is satisfied when x′ is in S and has favorite ¬y∗ (and hence
assigned ¬y∗), or, if x′ is in Z¬y∗ . We know that at least a(
1
2 − 
)
fraction of the individuals in S have the favorite ¬y∗.
Moreover, the size of Z¬y∗ is (1− θ)m2 . So, the probability
that condition (iii) is satisfied by x′ is at least(
1
2 − 
) |S|+ |Z¬y∗ |
m
=
1
2
(
1
2
− 
)
+
1
2
(1− θ).
Since x and x′ are sampled independently, the probability
that all three conditions are satisfied is at least(
1
2
− 
)
θ
2
·
[
1
2
(
1
2
− 
)
+
1
2
(1− θ)
]
.
This expression is a quadratic function in θ, that attains its
minimum at θ = 1 irrespective of the value of . Hence,
irrespective of D, this probability is at least [ 12 ( 12 − )]2.
For concreteness, let us choose  to be 1/10 (although it
can be set to be much smaller). On doing so, we have that
the three conditions are satisfied with probability at least
1/25. And when these conditions are satisfied, we have
u(x, hDu,S(x)) = 0 and u(x, h
D
u,S(x
′)) = Ls/2, i.e., x envies
x′ by Ls/2 = L/8. This shows that, when x and x′ are
sampled from P , with probability at least 1/25, x envies
x′ by L/8. We conclude that with probability at least 1 −
2 exp(−m/100)− exp(−m/200) jointly over the selection
of the utility function u and the sample S, the extension
of hu,S by D is not (α, β)-EF with respect to P for any
α < 1/25 and β < L/8.
To convert the joint probability into expected cost in the
game, note that for two discrete, independent random vari-
ables X and Y , and for a Boolean function E(X,Y ), it holds
that
PrX,Y (E(X,Y ) = 1) = EX [PrY (E(X,Y ) = 1)] . (2)
Given sample S and utility function u, let E(u, S) be the
Boolean function that equals 1 if and only if the extension
of hu,S by D is not (α, β)-EF with respect to P for any α <
1/25 and β < L/8. From Equation (2), Pru,S(E(u, S) = 1)
is equal to Eu [PrS(E(u, S) = 1)]. The latter term is exactly
the expected value of the cost, where the expectation is taken
over the randomness of u. It follows that the expected cost of
(any) D with respect to the chosen distribution over utilities
is at least 1− 2 exp(−m/100)− exp(−m/200).
4 Low-Complexity Families of Classifiers
In this section we show that (despite Theorem 2) generaliza-
tion for envy-freeness is possible using much smaller samples
of individuals, as long as we restrict ourselves to choosing a
classifier from a family of relatively low complexity.
In more detail, two classic complexity measures are the
VC-dimension (Vapnik and Chervonenkis, 1971) for binary
classifiers, and the Natarajan dimension (Natarajan, 1989)
for multi-class classifiers. However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no suitable dimension directly applicable to
functions ranging over distributions, which in our case can
be seen as |Y|-dimensional real vectors. One possibility
would be to restrict ourselves to deterministic classifiers of
the type h : X → Y . However, we have seen in Section 2
that envy-freeness is a very strong constraint on deterministic
classifiers. Instead, we will consider a familyH consisting of
randomized mixtures of deterministic classifiers belonging
to a family G ⊂ {g : X → Y} of low Natarajan dimen-
sion. This allows us to adapt Natarajan-dimension-based
generalization results to our setting while still working with
randomized classifiers.
4.1 Natarajan Dimension Primer
Before presenting our main result, we briefly summarize the
definition and relevant properties of the Natarajan dimension.
For more details, we refer the reader to (Shalev-Shwartz and
Ben-David, 2014).
We say that a family G multi-class shatters a set of points
x1, . . . , xn if there exist labels y1, . . . yn and y′1, . . . , y
′
n such
that for every i ∈ [n] we have yi 6= y′i, and for any subset
C ⊂ [n] there exists g ∈ G such that g(xi) = yi if i ∈ C and
g(xi) = y
′
i otherwise. The Natarajan dimension of a familyG is the cardinality of the largest set of points that can be
multi-class shattered by G.
For example, suppose we have a feature map Ψ : X ×
Y → Rq that maps each individual-outcome pair to a q-
dimensional feature vector, and consider the family of func-
tions that can be written as g(x) = arg maxy∈Yw
>Ψ(x, y)
for weight vectors w ∈ Rq . This family has Natarajan dimen-
sion at most q.
For a set S ⊂ X of points, we let G∣∣
S
denote the restriction
of G to S, which is any subset of G of minimal size such that
for every g ∈ G there exists g′ ∈ G∣∣
S
such that g(x) = g′(x)
for all x ∈ S. The size of G∣∣
S
is the number of different
labelings of the sample S achievable by functions in G. The
following Lemma is the analogue of Sauer’s lemma for binary
classification.
Lemma 1 (Natarajan). For a family G of Natarajan dimen-
sion d and any subset S ⊂ X , we have ∣∣G∣∣
S
∣∣ ≤ |S|d|Y|2d.
Classes of low Natarajan dimension also enjoy the follow-
ing uniform convergence guarantee.
Lemma 2. Let G have Natarajan dimension d and fix a
loss function ` : G × X → [0, 1]. For any distribution
P over X , if S is an i.i.d. sample drawn from P of size
O( 12 (d log |Y|+ log 1δ )), then with probability at least 1− δ
we have supg∈G
∣∣Ex∼P [`(g, x)]− 1n∑x∈S `(g, x)∣∣ ≤ .
4.2 Main Result
We consider the family of classifiers that can be expressed
as a randomized mixture of m deterministic classifiers se-
lected from a family G ⊂ {g : X → Y}. Our gen-
eralization guarantees will depend on the complexity of
the family G, measured in terms of its Natarajan dimen-
sion, and the number m of functions we are mixing. More
formally, let ~g = (g1, . . . , gm) ∈ Gm be a vector of m
functions in G and α ∈ ∆m be a distribution over [m],
where ∆m = {p ∈ Rm : pi ≥ 0,
∑
i pi = 1} is the m-
dimensional probability simplex. Then consider the function
h~g,α : X → ∆(Y) with assignment probabilities given by
Pr(h~g,α(x) = y) =
∑m
i=1 I{gi(x) = y}αi. Intuitively, for a
given individual x, h~g,α chooses one of the gi randomly with
probability αi, and outputs gi(x). Let
H(G,m) = {h~g,α : X → ∆(Y) : ~g ∈ Gm, α ∈ ∆m}
be the family of classifiers that can be written this way. Our
main technical result shows that envy-freeness generalizes
for this class.
Theorem 3. Suppose G is a family of deterministic classifiers
of Natarajan dimension d, and letH = H(G,m) for m ∈ N.
For any distribution P over X , γ > 0, and δ > 0, if S =
{(xi, x′i)}ni=1 is an i.i.d. sample of pairs drawn from P of
size
n ≥ O
(
1
γ2
(
dm2 log
dm|Y| log(m|Y|/γ)
γ
+ log
1
γ
))
,
then with probability at least 1 − δ, every classifier h ∈ H
that is (α, β)-pairwise-EF on S is also (α+ 7γ, β + 4γ)-EF
on P .
Theorem 3 is only effective insofar as families of classifiers
of low Natarajan dimension are useful. And, indeed, several
prominent families have low Natarajan dimension (Daniely,
Sabato, and Shalev-Shwartz, 2012), including one vs. all
(which is a special case of the example given in Section 4.1),
multiclass SVM, tree-based classifiers, and error correcting
output codes.
We now turn to the theorem’s proof, which consists of two
steps. First, we show that envy-freeness generalizes for finite
classes. Second, we show thatH(G,m) can be approximated
by a finite subset.
Lemma 3. Let H ⊂ {h : X → ∆(Y)} be a finite family
of classifiers. For any γ > 0, δ > 0, and β ≥ 0 if S =
{(xi, x′i)}ni=1 is an i.i.d. sample of pairs from P of size n ≥
1
2γ2 ln
|H|
δ , then with probability at least 1− δ, every h ∈ H
that is (α, β)-pairwise-EF on S (for any α) is also (α+γ, β)-
EF on P .
Proof. Let f(x, x′, h) = I{u(x, h(x)) < u(x, h(x′)) − β}
be the indicator that x is envious of x′ by at least β under
classifier h. Then f(xi, x′i, h) is a Bernoulli random vari-
able with success probability Ex,x′∼P [f(x, x′, h)]. Applying
Hoeffding’s inequality to any fixed hypothesis h ∈ H guaran-
tees that PrS(Ex,x′∼P [f(x, x′, h)] ≥ 1n
∑n
i=1 f(xi, x
′
i, h) +
γ) ≤ exp(−2nγ2). Therefore, if h is (α, β)-EF on S,
then it is also (α + γ, β)-EF on P with probability at least
1− exp(−2nγ2). Applying the union bound over all h ∈ H
and using the lower bound on n completes the proof.
Next, we show that H(G,m) can be covered by a finite
subset. Since each classifier inH is determined by the choice
of m functions from G and mixing weights α ∈ ∆m, we
will construct finite covers of G and ∆m. Our covers Gˆ and
∆ˆm will guarantee that for every g ∈ G, there exists gˆ ∈ Gˆ
such that Prx∼P (g(x) 6= gˆ(x)) ≤ γ/m. Similarly, for any
mixing weights α ∈ ∆m, there exists αˆ ∈ ∆m such that
‖α− αˆ‖1 ≤ γ. If h ∈ H(G,m) is the mixture of g1, . . . , gm
with weights α, we let hˆ be the mixture of gˆ1, . . . , gˆm with
weights αˆ. This approximation has two sources of error:
first, for a random individual x ∼ P , there is probability
up to γ that at least one gi(x) will disagree with gˆi(x), in
which case h and hˆ may assign completely different outcome
distributions. Second, even in the high-probability event that
gi(x) = gˆi(x) for all i ∈ [m], the mixing weights are not
identical, resulting in a small perturbation of the outcome
distribution assigned to x.
Lemma 4. Let G be a family of deterministic classifiers with
Natarajan dimension d, and let H = H(G,m) for some
m ∈ N. For any γ > 0, there exists a subset Hˆ ⊂ H of size
O
( (dm|Y|2 log(m|Y|/γ))dm
γ(d+1)m
)
such that for every h ∈ H there
exists hˆ ∈ H satisfying:
1. Prx∼P (‖h(x)− hˆ(x)‖1 > γ) ≤ γ.
2. If S is an i.i.d. sample of individuals of size
O(m
2
γ2 (d log |Y| + log 1δ )) then w.p. ≥ 1 − δ, we have
‖h(x)− hˆ(x)‖1 ≤ γ for all but a 2γ-fraction of x ∈ S.
Proof. As described above, we begin by constructing finite
covers of ∆m and G. First, let ∆ˆm ⊂ ∆m be the set of
distributions over [m] where each coordinate is a multiple
of γ/m. Then we have |∆ˆm| = O((mγ )m) and for every
p ∈ ∆m, there exists q ∈ ∆ˆm such that ‖p− q‖1 ≤ γ.
In order to find a small cover of G, we use the fact that it
has low Natarajan dimension. This implies that the number
of effective functions in G when restricted to a sample S′
grows only polynomially in the size of S′. At the same time,
if two functions in G agree on a large sample, they will also
agree with high probability on the distribution.
Formally, let S′ be an i.i.d. sample drawn from P of size
O(m
2
γ2 d log |Y|), and let Gˆ = G
∣∣
S′ be any minimal subset of
G that realizes all possible labelings of S′ by functions in G.
We now argue that with probability 0.99, for every g ∈ G
there exists gˆ ∈ Gˆ such that Prx∼P (g(x) 6= gˆ(x)) ≤ γ/m.
For any pair of functions g, g′ ∈ G, let (g, g′) : X → Y2
be the function given by (g, g′)(x) = (g(x), g′(x)), and let
G2 = {(g, g′) : g, g′ ∈ G}. The Natarajan dimension of
G2 is at most 2d (see Lemma 6 in Appendix C). Moreover,
consider the loss c : G2×X → {0, 1} given by c(g, g′, x) =
I{g(x) 6= g′(x)}. Applying Lemma 2 with the chosen size
of |S′| ensures that with probability at least 0.99 every pair
(g, g′) ∈ G2 satisfies∣∣∣∣∣ Ex∼P [c(g, g′, x)]− 1|S′| ∑
x∈S′
c(g, g′, x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ γm.
By the definition of Gˆ, for every g ∈ G, there exists gˆ ∈ Gˆ
for which c(g, gˆ, x) = 0 for all x ∈ S′, which implies that
Prx∼P (g(x) 6= gˆ(x)) ≤ γ/m.
Using Lemma 1 to bound the size of Gˆ, we have that
|Gˆ| ≤ |S′|d|Y|2d = O
((
m2
γ2
d|Y|2 log |Y|
)d)
.
Since this construction succeeds with non-zero probability,
we are guaranteed that such a set Gˆ exists. Finally, by an
identical uniform convergence argument, it follows that if
S is a fresh i.i.d. sample of the size given in Item 2 of the
lemma’s statement, then, with probability at least 1−δ, every
g and gˆ will disagree on at most a 2γ/m-fraction of S, since
they disagree with probability at most γ/m on P .
Next, let Hˆ = {h~g,α : ~g ∈ Gˆm, α ∈ ∆ˆm} be the same
family asH, except restricted to choosing functions from Gˆ
and mixing weights from ∆ˆm. Using the size bounds above
and the fact that
(
N
m
)
= O((Nm )
m), we have that
|Hˆ| =
(|Gˆ|
m
)
· |∆ˆm| = O
(
(dm2|Y|2 log(m|Y|/γ))dm
γ(2d+1)m
)
.
Suppose that h is the mixture of g1, . . . , gm ∈ G with
weights α ∈ ∆m. Let gˆi be the approximation to gi for each
i, let αˆ ∈ ∆ˆm be such that ‖α − αˆ‖1 ≤ γ, and let hˆ be
the random mixture of gˆ1, . . . , gˆm with weights αˆ. For an
individual x drawn from P , we have gi(x) 6= gˆi(x) with
probability at most γ/m, and therefore they all agree with
probability at least 1− γ. When this event occurs, we have
‖h(x)− hˆ(x)‖1 ≤ ‖α− αˆ‖1 ≤ γ.
The second part of the claim follows by similar reasoning,
using the fact that for the given sample size |S|, with proba-
bility at least 1− δ, every g ∈ G disagrees with its approxi-
mation gˆ ∈ Gˆ on at most a 2γ/m-fraction of S. This means
that gˆi(x) = gi(x) for all i ∈ [m] on at least a (1 − 2γ)-
fraction of the individuals x in S. For these individuals,
‖h(x)− hˆ(x)‖1 ≤ ‖α− αˆ‖1 ≤ γ.
Combining the generalization guarantee for finite fami-
lies given in Lemma 3 with the finite approximation given
in Lemma 4, we are able to show that envy-freeness also
generalizes forH(G,m).
Proof of Theorem 3. Let Hˆ be the finite approximation to
H constructed in Lemma 4. If the sample is of size
|S| = O( 1γ2 (dm log(dm|Y| log |Y|/γ) + log 1δ )), we can
apply Lemma 3 to this finite family, which implies that
for any β′ ≥ 0, with probability at least 1 − δ/2 every
hˆ ∈ Hˆ that is (α′, β′)-pairwise-EF on S (for any α′) is
also (α′ + γ, β′)-EF on P . We apply this lemma with
β′ = β + 2γ. Moreover, from Lemma 4, we know that
if |S| = O(m2γ2 (d log |Y|+ log 1δ )), then with probability at
least 1 − δ/2, for every h ∈ H, there exists hˆ ∈ Hˆ satis-
fying ‖h(x) − hˆ(x)‖1 ≤ γ for all but a 2γ-fraction of the
individuals in S. This implies that on all but at most a 4γ-
fraction of the pairs in S, h and hˆ satisfy this inequality for
both individuals in the pair. Assume these high probability
events occur. Finally, from Item 1 of the lemma we have that
Prx1,x2∼P (maxi=1,2 ‖h(xi)− hˆ(xi)‖1 > γ) ≤ 2γ.
Now let h ∈ H be any classifier that is (α, β)-pairwise-EF
on S. Since the utilities are in [0, 1] and maxx=xi,x′i ‖h(x)−
hˆ(x)‖1 ≤ γ for all but a 4γ-fraction of the pairs in S, we
know that hˆ is (α+4γ, β+2γ)-pairwise-EF on S. Applying
the envy-freeness generalization guarantee (Lemma 3) for Hˆ,
it follows that hˆ is also (α+ 5γ, β + 2γ)-EF on P . Finally,
using the fact that
Pr
x1,x2∼P
(
max
i=1,2
‖h(xi)− hˆ(xi)‖1 > γ
)
≤ 2γ,
it follows that h is (α+ 7γ, β + 4γ)-EF on P .
It is worth noting that the (exponentially large) approxima-
tion Hˆ is only used in the generalization analysis; importantly,
an ERM algorithm need not construct it.
5 Discussion
We believe that envy-freeness gives a new, useful perspective
on individual fairness in classification — when individuals
have rich utility functions, which, as we have argued in detail
in Section 1, is the case in advertising. However, in some
domains there are only two possible outcomes, one of which
is ‘good’ and the other ’bad’; examples include predicting
whether an individual would default on a loan, and whether
an offender would recidivate. In these degenerate cases envy-
freeness would require that the classifier assign each and
every individual the exact same probability of obtaining the
‘good’ outcome, which, clearly, is not a reasonable constraint.
It is also worth noting that we have not directly addressed
the problem of computing the loss-minimizing envy-free clas-
sifier from a given family on a given sample of individuals.
Just like in the work of Dwork et al. (2012), when the clas-
sifier is arbitrary, this problem can be written as a linear
program of polynomial size in the number of outcomes, be-
cause envy-freeness amounts to a set of linear constraints. In
both settings, though, one needs to restrict the family of clas-
sifiers to obtain good sample complexity, and, moreover, the
naı¨ve formulation would be intractable when dealing with a
combinatorial space of outcomes. Nevertheless, the linearity
of envy-freeness may enable practical mixed-integer linear
programming formulations with respect to certain families.
More generally, given the wealth of powerful optimization
tools at the community’s disposal, we do not view computa-
tional complexity as a long-term obstacle to implementing
our approach.
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A Appendix for Section 2
Example 1. Let S = {x1, x2} and Y = {y1, y2, y3}. Let
the loss function be such that
`(x1, y1) = 0 `(x1, y2) = 1 `(x1, y3) = 1
`(x2, y1) = 1 `(x2, y2) = 1 `(x2, y3) = 0
And let the utility function be such that
u(x1, y1) = 0 u(x1, y2) = 1 u(x1, y3) =
1
γ
u(x2, y1) = 0 u(x2, y2) = 0 u(x2, y3) = 1
where γ > 1. Now, the only deterministic classifier with a
loss of 0 is h0 such that h0(x1) = y1 and h0(x2) = y3. But,
this is not EF, since u(x1, y1) < u(x1, y3). Furthermore,
every other deterministic classifier has a total loss of at least
1, causing the optimal deterministic EF classifier to have loss
of at least 1.
To show that randomized classifiers can do much better,
consider the randomized classifier h∗ such that h∗(x1) =
(1− 1/γ, 1/γ, 0) and h∗(x2) = (0, 0, 1). This classifier can
be seen as a mixture of the classifier h0 of 0 loss, and the
deterministic classifier he, where he(x1) = y2 and he(x2) =
y3, which has high “negative envy”. One can observe that
this classifier h∗ is EF, and has a loss of just 1/γ. Hence,
the loss of the optimal randomized EF classifier is γ times
smaller than the loss of the optimal deterministic one, for any
γ > 1.
B Appendix for Section 3
Theorem 1. Let d be a metric on X , P be a distribution on
X , and u be an L-Lipschitz utility function. Let S be a set
of individuals such that there exists Xˆ ⊂ X with P (Xˆ ) ≥
1− α and supx∈Xˆ (d(x,NNS(x)) ≤ β/(2L). Then for any
classifier h : S → ∆(Y) that is EF on S, the extension
h : X → ∆(Y) given by h(x) = h(NNS(x)) is (α, β)-EF
on P .
Proof. Let h : S → ∆(Y) be any EF classifier on S and h :
X → ∆(Y) be the nearest neighbor extension. Sample x and
x′ from P . Then, x belongs to the subset Xˆ with probability
at least 1−α. When this occurs, x has a neighbor within dis-
tance β/(2L) in the sample. Using the Lipschitz continuity of
u, we have |u(x, h(x)) − u(NNS(x), h(NNS(x)))| ≤ β/2.
Similarly, |u(x, h(x′))− u(NNS(x), h(NNS(x′)))| ≤ β/2.
Finally, since NNS(x) does not envy NNS(x′) under h, it
follows that x does not envy x′ by more than β under h.
Lemma 5. Suppose X ⊂ Rq , d(x, x′) = ‖x− x′‖2, and let
D = supx,x′∈X d(x, x
′) be the diameter ofX . For any distri-
bution P over X , β > 0, α > 0, and δ > 0 there exists Xˆ ⊂
X such that P (Xˆ ) ≥ 1−α and, if S is an i.i.d. sample drawn
from P of size |S| = O( 1α (
LD
√
q
β )
q(d log
LD
√
q
β + log
1
δ )),
then with probability at least 1−δ, supx∈Xˆ d(x,NNS(x)) ≤
β/(2L).
Proof. Let C be the smallest cube containing X . Since the
diameter of X is D, the side-length of C is at most D. Let
s = β/(2L
√
q) be the side-length such that a cube with side-
length s has diameter β/(2L). It takes at most m = dD/seq
cubes of side-length s to cover C. Let C1, . . . , Cm be such a
covering, where each Ci has side-length s.
Let Ci be any cube in the cover for which P (Ci) > α/m.
The probability that a sample of size n drawn from P does
not contain a sample in Ci is at most (1−α/m)n ≤ e−nα/m.
Let I = {i ∈ [m] : P (Ci) ≥ α/m}. By the union bound,
the probability that there exists i ∈ I such that Ci does not
contain a sample is at most me−nα/m. Setting
n =
m
α
ln
m
δ
= O
(
1
α
(
LD
√
q
β
)q(
q log
LD
√
q
β
+ log
1
δ
))
results in this upper bound being δ. For the remainder of the
proof, assume this high probability event occurs.
Now let Xˆ = ⋃i∈I Ci. For each j 6∈ I , we know that
P (Cj) < α/m. Since there at most m such cubes, their
total probability mass is at most α. It follows that P (Xˆ ) ≥
1 − α. Moreover, every point x ∈ Xˆ belongs to one of the
cubes Ci with i ∈ I , which also contains a sample point.
Since the diameter of the cubes in our cover is β/(2L), it
follows that dist(x,NNS(x)) ≤ β/(2L) for every x ∈ Xˆ ,
as required.
C Appendix for Section 4
Lemma 6. Let G = {g : X → Y} have Natarajan di-
mension d. For g1, g2 ∈ G, let (g1, g2) : X → Y2 denote
the function given by (g1, g2)(x) = (g1(x), g2(x)) and let
G2 = {(g1, g2) : g1, g2 ∈ G}. Then the Natarajan dimen-
sion of G2 is at most 2d.
Proof. Let D be the Natarajan dimension of G2. Then we
know that there exists a collection of points x1, . . . , xD ∈ X
that is shattered by G2, which means there are two sequences
q1, . . . , qn ∈ Y2 and q′1, . . . , q′n ∈ Y2 such that for all i we
have qi 6= q′i and for any subset C ⊂ [D] of indices, there
exists (g1, g2) ∈ G2 such that (g1, g2)(xi) = qi if i ∈ C and
(g1, g2)(xi) = q
′
i otherwise.
Let n1 =
∑D
i=1 I{qi1 6= q′i1} and n2 =
∑D
i=1 I{qi2 6=
q′i2} be the number of pairs on which the first and second
labels of qi and q′i disagree, respectively. Since none of
the n pairs are equal, we know that n1 + n2 ≥ D, which
implies that at at least one of n1 or n2 must be ≥ D/2.
Assume without loss of generality that n1 ≥ D/2 and that
qi1 6= q′i1 for i = 1, . . . , n1. Now consider any subset of
indices C ⊂ [n1]. We know there exists a pair of functions
(g1, g2) ∈ G2 with (g1, g2)(xi) evaluating to qi if i ∈ C and
q′i if i 6∈ C. But then we have g1(xi) = qi1 if i ∈ C and
g1(xi) = q
′
i1 if i 6∈ C, and qi1 6= q′i1 for all i ∈ [n1]. It
follows that G shatters x1, . . . , xn1 , which consists of at least
D/2 points. Therefore, the Natarajan dimension of G2 is at
most 2d, as required.
